Moral Cognitivism and Legal Positivism in Habermas’s and Kant's Philosophy of Law
vol. 16, n. 3 (2017) • Ethic@ - Revista Internacional de Filosofia Moral
Autor: Delamar José Volpato Dutra, Nythamar de Oliveira
Resumo:
The hypothesis of this paper is that legal positivism depends on the non plausibility of strong moral cognitivism because of the non necessary connection thesis between law and morality that legal positivism is supposed to acknowledge. The paper concludes that only when based on strong moral cognitivism is it consistent to sustain the typical non-positivistic thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality. Habermas’s Philosophy of law is confronted with both positions.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2017v16n3p533
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/1677-2954.2017v16n3p533/35918
Palavras-Chave: Habermas,positivism,moral cognitivism
Ethic@ - Revista Internacional de Filosofia Moral
ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Phylosophy - uma publicação do Núcleo de Ética e Filosofia Política da UFSC, tem como objetivo principal publicar trabalhos inéditos (artigos, resenhas, entrevistas, traduções), com excelência e vanguarda na área de Filosofia Moral Moderna e Contemporânea.