Locke, on freedom and will

Vol 10, No 3 (2009) • Filosofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy

Autor: Marília Côrtes de Ferraz

Resumo:

This article aims to discuss Locke’s compatibilism, that is, the lokean thesis that freedom is compatible with the natural necessity. To this end, it is analized the chapter Of The Power (XXI, book II of the An Essay concerning Human Understanding), in which Locke clarifies the concepts of freedom and will. Although Locke, at times, involves himself with the incongruent thesis on compatibilism, he is a compatibilist. The impression that Locke would defend incompatibilists’ theories ends up being abandoned when we analyze carefully his general argument about will and freedom. Locke literally defends that the volunteer does not differ from the necessary. As a compatibilist, Locke maintains that will is not free. Thus, the free man can not be the one that is free to want. A man regarded as a free agent is the one that has freedom of action, not freedom of will.

ISSN: ISSN: 1984-8234

Texto Completo: http://revistas.unisinos.br/index.php/filosofia/article/view/5027

Palavras-Chave: freedom,will,compatibilism, choice,necessity

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