¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein
Vol 20, No 3 (2016) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: David Suarez-Rivero
Resumo:
In this paper I focus my attention on the proposal given by Howard Wettstein in 1980 to the cognitive phenomenon stated by Gottlob Frege in his paper “On sense and reference”. I offer three arguments in order to show that his answer does not weaken this phenomenon. Particularly, I defend three ideas: first, it is legitimate that philosophical semantics, in contrast with what Wettstein defends, provides an answer to the cognitive phenomenon; second, Wettstein does not conceive Frege’s argument correctly by considering it generates a semantic theory from a purely mentalist phenomenon; third, the explanation supplied by Wettstein is assumed by Frege when he states the phenomenon.
ISSN: 1414-4217
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n3p427
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/808-1711.2016v20n3p427/33916
Palavras-Chave: Howard Wettstein,Frege’s puzzle,Philosophical
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
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"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2