Autor: Roberto Horácio Sá Pereira

Abstract:

This brief paper is devoted to criticizing the widespread reading of Kant’s first Critique, according to which reference to subject-independent objects is “constituted” by higherorder cognitive abilities (concepts). Let us call this the “constitutional view”. In this paper, I argue that the constitutional reading confuses the un-Kantian problem of how we come to represent objects (which I call the intentionality thesis), with the quite different problem of how we cognize (erkennen) (which I call the “cognition thesis”) that we do represent objects, that is, things that exist independently of the subject.

ISSN: 1414-4217

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p165

Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2016v20n2p165/33472

Palavras-Chave: Constitutional view,non-conceptual content,th