La naturalidad del escepticismo
Vol 16, No 2 (2012) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: Jesus Antonio Coll Mármol
Abstract:
In this article I examine M. Williams’ antisceptical strategy of considering skepticism as an unnatural position philosophically charged, which for him implies that skepticism has nothing to do with our epistemic practices. I admit that this strategy is really promising, especially when applied to Cartesian scepticism. However, when it faces an older ancestor of Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism, this situation changes. I concentrate on Fogelin’s neopyrrhonist proposal and how Williams’ strategy would face it. I will defend that Pyrrhonian scepticism is a completely natural kind of scepticism according to our epistemic practices. I will also maintain that this kind of skepticism is the unavoidable result of reflecting about those epistemic practices.
ISSN: 1414-4217
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p277
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2012v16n2p277/24102
Palavras-Chave: Skepticism,pyrrhonism,Michel Williams,Robert
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
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"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2