Against Contextualism: Belief, Evidence, & the Bank Cases

Vol 17, No 1 (2013) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology

Autor: Logan Paul Gage

Abstract:

Contextualism (the view that ‘knowledge’ and its variants are context-sensitive) has been supported in large part through appeal to intuitions about Keith DeRose’s Bank Cases. Recently, however, the contextualist construal of these cases has come under fire from Kent Bach and Jennifer Nagel who question whether the Bank Case subject’s confidence can remain constant in both low- and high-stakes cases. Having explained the Bank Cases and this challenge to them, I argue that DeRose has given a reasonable reply to this initial challenge. However, I proceed to argue that the current stalemate can be broken. Seeking to extend the Bach–Nagel critique, I offer a novel interpretation of the Bank Cases according to which the subject’s evidence changes between low- and high-stakes cases. If I am correct, then, given the amount of support the Bank Cases have been thought to lend contextualism, the case for contextualism is seriously weakened.

ISSN: 1414-4217

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n1p57

Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2013v17n1p57/26263

Palavras-Chave: K. DeRose,K. Bach,J. Nagel,bank cases,context

Principia: an international journal of epistemology

"PRINCIPIA
"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2