Contextualism, skepticism, and invariantism
Vol 14, No 3 (2010) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: Stephen Jacobson
Abstract:
Michael Williams and Keith DeRose defend their different versions of contextualism on the grounds that contextualism gives a better account of the ordinary use of epistemic terms than invariantist competitors. One aim of this paper is to explain why their arguments do not succeed. A further aim is to show that the dispute between contextualists and invariantists portrayed by Williams and DeRose is a narrow interpretation of the dispute: there are important contextualist and invariantist positions which fall outside the scope of their arguments and which a full defense of contextualism should consider.
ISSN: 1414-4217
DOI: DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n3p375
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/1808-1711.2010v14n3p375/18711
Palavras-Chave: Contextualism, skepticism, invariantism
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
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"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2