Autor: Otávio Bueno

Abstract:

In his defense of a coherence theory of truth and knowledge, Donald Davidson insists that (i) we must take the objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief, and (ii) given the nature of beliefs, most of our beliefs are veridical. As result, a response to skepticism is provided. If most of our beliefs turn out to be true, global skepticism is ultimately incoherent. In this paper, I argue that, despite the many attractions that a coherence theory has, a response to skepticism is not among them. After distinguishing three forms of skepticism (global skepticism, Pyrrhonian skepticism and lottery skepticism), I argue that none of them is affected by Davidson’s strategy.

ISSN: 1414-4217

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/%25x

Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/14541/13313

Palavras-Chave: Davidson; skepticism; coherence theory; knowl