Russell and Humean Inferences
Vol 5, No 1-2 (2001) • Principia: an international journal of epistemology
Autor: João Paulo Monteiro
Abstract:
Russell's The Problems of Philosophy tries to establish a new theory of induction, at the same time that Hume is there accused of an irrationa/sceptictsm about induction". But a careful analysis of the theory of knowledge explicitly acnowledged by Hume revoais thctt, contrary to the standard interpretation in the XXth century, possibly influenced by Russell, Hume deals exclusively with causal inference (which he never classifies as "causal induction", although now we are entitkd to do so), never with inductive inference in general, mainly generalisations abouy sensible qualities of objects ( whether, e.g., "all crows are black" or not is not arnong Hume's concerns). Russell's the,ories are thus only false alternatives
to Hume's, in (1912) or in his (1948).
ISSN: 1414-4217
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/%25x
Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/17761/16345
Palavras-Chave: induction; causation; inference; scepticism;
Principia: an international journal of epistemology
"Principia: an international journal of epistemology" was founded in 1997 and regularly publishes articles, discussions and review. The journal aims to publish original scholarly work especially in epistemology area , with an emphasis on material of general interest to academic philosophers. Originally published only in print version (ISSN: 1414-4247), in 2005 the journal began to be published also in online version (ISSN: 1808-1711). Since 1999 are published three issues per year: in April, August and December. Qualis CAPES: A2