Autor: Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra

Abstract:

Since Hume, the problem of induction is vtewed as the problem of skeptical doubts concerning our empirical generalizations. In this paper, I argue that this problem is neither a question for epistemology nor a consequence of a skeptical (pyhrronian) view on the matter. Rather I argue that from the point of view of alethic skepticism, Hume's problem appears to be an issue concerning the pragmatics of investigation, and I try to report some of its most basic aspects. The result is a new image of induction that resembles with Nelson Goodman's solution, but I avoid any dogmatic commitment to his ideas.

ISSN: 1414-4217

DOI: https://doi.org/10.5007/%25x

Texto Completo: https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/18780/17371

Palavras-Chave: Ceticismo alético; indução; pragmática da inv